Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: illgen@hq.af.mil (Keneth..Illgen) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Panama Message-ID: <12700@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 2 Jan 90 02:48:05 GMT References: <12604@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: Air Force HQ, The Pentagon Lines: 63 Approved: military@att.att.com From: illgen@hq.af.mil (Keneth..Illgen) In article <12604@cbnews.ATT.COM> shaig%shum.Huji.AC.IL@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (Shai Guday) writes: >The impression I have received is that the invasion did not accomplish >its military objectives of: >1. Capturing Noriega. I think it's important to contemplate what exactly the administration had in mind when it decided to strike the PDF and Noriega. I would hope that no one briefed the President that U.S. forces would CERTAINLY capture Noriega. It was common knowledge that Noriega has been constantly on the move; sometimes moving around to four or five locales in a given evening. While someone might have kept better tabs on him it was obvious that he would have been a tough nut to nail down when the operation started or immediatly before. The present situation does pose interesting questions as to whether or not he is actually captured. No, he is not in the hands of the U.S. However he certainly is limited in his present movement and it seems as though the Vatican isn't going to allow him to stay in their embassy much longer. The final objective of bringing Noriega to the U.S. has not been achieved but the President should feel comfortable that U.S. troops drove him to the Vatican embassy. I'm certain he wouldn't feel too good if Noriega made it to the Cuban embassy. >2. Removing him from the political/military arena in Panama. If you can explain to me what influence he still holds over the political/military arena then I might believe this statement. The fact that he is still alive keeps him in the public eye but he holds no influence over events in Panama. The objectives of the U.S. were to put him out of business, install the rightfully elected government and bring Noriega to a U.S. courtroom. >My impression has been that the initial intelligence was faulty >and no satisfactory contingency plans were prepared for the events >that arose. It is still unclear to me why the US opted for a large >scale involvement, to which I currently see no end, rather than >a clean "surgical" operation by elite forces, with a large scale >followup dependent upon a successful accomplishment of (1). >Any opinions? I noticed only two flaws in the operation; 1) Landing Marines in the mud. For as long as we've been in Panama we should've had the area staked out better. Fortunatly for the Marines the locals were friendly and helped them. If it had been some 'Ding-Bats' it would've been ugly. 2) Not knocking out all radio and television not controlled by U.S. forces immediatly. Allowing a Noriega tape to be played could have been devastating. These few flaws in an otherwise competent operation don't indicate to me a lack of intelligence. In order to eliminate the pockets of resistance that would be present it was necessary to bring in the additional troops. Keep in mind that the 13,000 troops already in Panama had their responsibilities to their fixed stations (e.g the Howard AFB flightline). Those whose mission was strictly defense of these facilities and the canal needed augmentation by light and Airborne forces. A surgical strike would have been effective for snatching Noriega but with the Ding-Bats pocketed around the country and the uncertainty of who in the PDF would turn over their weapons it was obvious that we would need greater numbers to do the job.