Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!clyde.concordia.ca!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!uwm.edu!bionet!ig!arizona!mike
From: mike@cs.arizona.edu (Mike Coffin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Sci. American AI debate
Message-ID: <16577@megaron.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: 4 Jan 90 18:28:35 GMT
References: <85384@linus.UUCP>
Organization: U of Arizona CS Dept, Tucson
Lines: 31

I finally got around to reading the artificial intelligence "debate"
in Scientific American (Jan., 1990).  Several points struck me while
reading the two articles.

First, it looks to me like advocates of strong and weak AI don't
really communicate with each other.  Searle, in particular, insists
that he has *proven* that a mind is more than a program, and he
professes puzzlement about why anyone could fail to see the logic of
his position.  The other side brings up counter arguments one after
an other.  Both sides are convinced that their arguments are
"obviously" right and assume that the other side is, willfully or
out of ignorance, missing the whole point.

Second, it seems to me that Searle has set a tough task for
himself---to "prove" logically his contention.  That is tough because
he is trying to prove something about "thought", a term that he never
defines.  Without a definition he will never produce a very convincing
proof.  The other side is in much better shape because they only have
to poke holes in his arguments.

Finally, it seems to me that the Churchlands got the better of this
exchange.  They point out that Searle's "axiom" that syntax cannot
give rise to semantics is (a) not at all obvious and (b) begs the
question.  Searle's only response to this is that it's "true by
definition" (what definition?) or "rather obvious" (to whom?).  Since
the negation of this axiom is essentially a restatement of the strong
AI position, it's hardly seems fair to use it as an assumption.
-- 
Mike Coffin				mike@arizona.edu
Univ. of Ariz. Dept. of Comp. Sci.	{allegra,cmcl2}!arizona!mike
Tucson, AZ  85721			(602)621-2858