Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!ucsd!sdcsvax!beowulf!pluto From: pluto@beowulf.ucsd.edu (Mark E. P. Plutowski) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Recursive Searles, or what? Summary: Kinda like "Turtles all the way down." Keywords: understanding Message-ID: <7661@sdcsvax.UCSD.Edu> Date: 5 Jan 90 20:09:19 GMT References: <12679@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <12702@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> Sender: nobody@sdcsvax.UCSD.Edu Reply-To: pluto@beowulf.UCSD.EDU (Mark E. P. Plutowski) Organization: EE/CS Dept. U.C. San Diego Lines: 65 Fred Gilham writes: >I interpret Searle's argument as follows: > >There is something we (humans) do, called understanding. We usually >know when we do it, and we can often say when others do or do not >understand. We can also give examples of..."not understanding" ... > > [stuff deleted] >[Suppose] someone emulates this system by hand, ... [who] >doesn't understand Chinese, yet [can] follow the rules and produce >the desired results. [The only] >physical apparatus existing is the books, paper, and the person who >doesn't understand Chinese. The question is, what understands >Chinese? Searle claims that there is nothing there to understand >Chinese. > I'm sorry to belabor the point, but I still am not convinced after months of patiently following this argument. What follows is not a counter, but rather is intended to be an honest desire to clarify my 'understanding' of the concept to a level enabling me to not only say I understand, but prove it to some objective logician. We believe Searle-in-the-box when he claims to not-understand. Why? Don't we have an objective definition of "understanding?" Why don't we have an objective definition of understanding? Why do we have to ask Searle whether or not he understands, in order to ourselves decide whether or not he understands? How can a proof be based upon a definition which is subjective to an element of the proof itself? Assume instead Searle-in-the-box says he does understand. Are we to believe him then? Saying it doesn't make it so. Yet, then according to the argument, the Room would understand. If we ask the Chinese Room itself whether it understands, (in Chinese, of course, so Searle-in-the-box will not understand the query) and by some fluke in the rules it somehow answers "Yes" ... Now what? Why not believe the box's reply? I don't think it is decidable whether to believe the Chinese Room if it says it understands, based upon the subjective definitions given so far. Suppose we did not know whether Searle was Searle; suppose it were possible he were indeed a Chinese Room - we know not which - on what basis do we decide whether to believe him when he says he does understand? Because, apparently, we have the "ground rules" laid out such that there is no way the room can understand if Searle-inside does not. So, if Searle says he understands, but then we find out Searle is not Searle, but is instead a Chinese Room with another Searle inside, Searle-2, and Searle-2 "does not understand" - because he says so --- is this not a contradiction?? But wait, what if Searle-2 really has a Searle-3 inside, who DOES understand? Somebody save me. I am not biased against Searle's basic point: (IMHO) that the implementation matters. I just don't see the logic behind the counter to the systems reply, and would like to hear it expressed in objective terms. Prove to me the Chinese Room does not understand, without resorting to asking Searle-inside whether (or not) he does.