Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cornell!oravax!daryl From: daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Sci. American AI debate: No Contest Message-ID: <1222@oravax.UUCP> Date: 5 Jan 90 21:31:02 GMT References: <12679@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <12702@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> Organization: Odyssey Research Associates, Ithaca NY Lines: 34 Summary: According to my interpretation of strong AI (which may be wrong) running programs understand, not physical entities. In article , gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes: > If one claims that the ``system'' somehow understands Chinese, Searle > says that you can do away with the books and paper, and memorize the > rules. The person doing the manipulation will still not understand > Chinese, and there is no other physical entity left to be a candidate ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > for understanding. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I may be departing from the orthodox strong AI position for saying this, but it seems to me that it is not *physical entities* that can be said to understand or not to understand, but *running programs*. Since a program has to run on some physical entity, such as a brain, or a computer, then you may wonder what difference does it make whether one associates an understanding mind with the physical entity or with the running program. Well, the biggest difference is that there may be more than one mind associated with a single physical entity. I don't see how Searle's tactic of doing away with the books and paper and memorizing the rules himself changes anything; there are still two programs running: the one hard-wired into Searle's brain, which of course doesn't understand, and the one programmed into the rules he memorized, which may or may not understand. In order for Searle's argument against the systems reply to have any force, he needs to show that it is impossible for more than one system (candidate for understanding, as you put it) to be associated with a given physical entity. He seems to take the one-to-one correspondence between minds and physical entities for granted, although it is certainly not obvious to me. Daryl McCullough The Crux of the Bisquit is the Apostrophe