Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!uunet!samsung!usc!apple!hercules!gilham From: gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Sci. American AI debate Message-ID: Date: 6 Jan 90 18:02:41 GMT References: <85384@linus.UUCP> <16577@megaron.cs.arizona.edu> <12667@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <52471@srcsip.UUCP> Sender: usenet@csl.sri.com Organization: Computer Science Lab, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA. Lines: 29 In-reply-to: gilham@csl.sri.com's message of 5 Jan 90 23:26:48 GMT I wrote: ------- You mention three processes: 1) what AI programs do, 2) algorithmic computing, and 3) human thinking. However, there are at most two distinct processes here. That is, AI programs + hardware + some intelligent being to interpret the results = algorithmic computing. This is a basic concept. There are no programs that run on computers that are not algorithmic. The question is whether 2 and 3 are equivalent. The strong AI position is that they are. But the whole point of the Chinese Room argument is that Searle can be doing something that falls in category 2 yet not be doing 3, AND can be aware of the fact that he is doing 2 and not doing 3. ----- The second paragraph should have said: The question is whether 2 and 3 are equivalent. The strong AI position is that they are. It claims that if a computer system could pass the Turing test, it would be doing 3 by doing 2. Searle's argument says that if he himself could pass the Turing test with a system composed of rules in books, he would know that he is still not doing 3. If he is not, then what is? Because his procedure with the books and rules is equivalent in power to any algorithmic procedure that could be executed on a computer, the same question applies to a computer that could pass the Turing test. -Fred Gilham gilham@csl.sri.com