Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!ames!think!samsung!shadooby!umich!itivax!dhw
From: dhw@itivax.iti.org (David H. West)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Late thoughts on T Test, rooms, and functions
Message-ID: <4753@itivax.iti.org>
Date: 8 Jan 90 06:13:08 GMT
References: <2762@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Reply-To: dhw@itivax.UUCP (David H. West)
Organization: Industrial Technology Institute
Lines: 23

In article <2762@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> cjoslyn@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes:
>What is the significance of something really not being intelligence yet
>for all the observations we can possibly make on it it appears to be
>intelligent (e.g.  Searle's room)? 

If one refrains from reifying intelligence (yes, I know it's too
late), one doesn't even ask that question.

Searle's position seems to me to be the result of adopting an
indefensible view of understanding;  our everyday model of
understanding asserts that it is 
1) boolean-valued (you either have it or you don't on a given topic); 
2) atomic (it is magically available to introspection, but has no
   components); and
3) veridical (you're infallible about what you claim to understand).    

Additionally, Searle implicitly assumes understanding to be 

4) static (he wouldn't learn Chinese by following the rules).

None of these assertions withstands much examination.

-David West    dhw@iti.org