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From: pnf@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu (Paul N Fahn)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: more Chinese Room
Message-ID: <2602@cunixc.cc.columbia.edu>
Date: 9 Jan 90 04:31:56 GMT
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Reply-To: pnf@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu (Paul N Fahn)
Organization: Columbia University
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I have always felt that there was something unfair and structurally
unsound in Searle's argument, and upon reading his recent article in 
Scientific American, I've put my finger on it.

In the recent article, the man in the Chinese room is Searle himself.
One of his conlusions is that after being in the Chinese room, he still
does not understand Chinese. He gives no arguments to support this 
conclusion, but simply states it. Putting himself in the room is unfair
because it puts Searle in an authoritative position to state what is
or isn't being "understood". Anyone else trying to argue that perhaps
the man does in fact understand Chinese is put at a structural dis-
advantage because no one would know better than Searle himself whether
or not he understands Chinese.
  I could just as easily say that I am in the Chinese room and that 
after a period of time I do indeed understand Chinese. How could Searle 
argue and tell me I don't? He would rightfully claim that my argument 
is unfair.

Let's say Searle uses a third-person man in the room. He still states
that the man does not understand Chinese after being in the room and
therefore, computers cannot understand. The (unstated) appeal of the
argument is "pretend you are in the room following the rules. you
wouldn't understand Chinese, right?". He is basically asking people to
try to identify with a computer cpu and then conclude non-understanding.
He doesn't state the argument this way because it is not a sound logical
argument.

The way the Chinese room problem *should* be presented is as an experiment:
  Take a man who doesn't understand Chinese and put him in a room with all
the necessary rules. Let him execute the rules, answering written questions
put him by Chinese speakers. After two years we, the experimenters, gather
our results: does the man understand Chinese?
  We can argue about the answer, and try to devise criteria which, if 
satisfied, would convince us that he does or does not understand Chinese.
This is the point of the Turing test.

Searle however, simply states the results of the experiment as if it were a
premise: the man does not understand Chinese. He is in fact using circular
reasoning: because he does not understand Chinese, syntax is not enough to
get semantics. But what is his reason for concluding the man does not 
understand Chinese? simply his prior conviction that syntax is not enough 
for semantics.

The need for an external test (Turing or otherwise) is due to the fact that
we cannot directly know the man's internal mental state. While admitting 
that the man passes the Turing test, Searle does not present some other 
test which the man fails to pass. If Searle thinks that the Turing test 
is inadequate, let him devise another and argue why the man would fail 
this "better" test. "pretend you're the man" is not an adaquate test.

Basically, Searle's argument comes down to: "Pretend you're a 
computer. Do you understand Chinese?"  

Let us look at Searle's recent twist to the problem: the man memorizes
the rules and answers Chinese questions in public. We the experimenters
watch him do this for two years and then must decide whether he 
understands Chinese. A lot of people would conclude that he does indeed
understand Chinese, even if they "knew" that he was following rules.

--------------
Paul Fahn
pnf@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu