Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!clyde.concordia.ca!uunet!mcsun!ukc!edcastle!aiai!jeff
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Sci. American AI debate: No Contest
Keywords: Searle Churchland Speed
Message-ID: <1519@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 9 Jan 90 17:12:35 GMT
References: <12679@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> <12702@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
Reply-To: jeff@aiai.UUCP (Jeff Dalton)
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Lines: 52

In article <12702@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> kpfleger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Karl Robert Pfleger) writes:
>Which brings us to the point I made a few posts back, I think to
>this group. The point is that most of the Searle article rests on
>definitions. Here the one in question is symbol manipulation. The more
>critical one, I think, is understanding. Also, intelligence is a key
>one. The whole conclusion of the argument is that the system can't
>'understand' or won't be 'intelligent.' But these things are never
>defined.

Suppose there's a conversation taking place in Chinese and someone
asks "do you understand Chinese?"  Would you find this a difficult
question to akswer?  Would you need a carefully articulated definition
of "understand" first?  I don't think you would.  I know I wouldn't.

This doesn't mean we can forever put off considering just what we mean
by "understand".  But I don't think you will ever understand why the
Chinese Room argument appeals to anyone if you insist that no one can
form a valid opinion until all the terms have been carefully defined.

I think anyone who wants a definition should try defining it themself.
I don't think it's all that easy to do, and it's easy to get it wrong.
That is, it's easy to end up with a definition that doesn't really
match your notion of understanding (some things you wouldn't consider
understanding satisfy your definition, or some things that you would
don't).

>In fact, Searle seems to have his definitions already in his head and
>they seem to be defined precisely so that his argument is true, which
>makes the argument trivial. You seem to have decided the fate already
>too:

Well, that's the problem with definitions: accusations of begging the
question.  My suspicion about those who are demanding definitions is
that they hope the definition will let them settle the issue in a
fairly straightforward way.  But if the problem really is a hard one,
what then?  

The danger is that we'll end up arguing about whether various things
should be called "understanding" when what we should be looking at is
whether there are any interesting differences between humans and machines.

>The reason everyone disagrees about the Searle article(s)/ideas is that
>he doesn't provide any definitions and so people must supply their own.

I think there's more to it than that.  For example, some people seem
to feel that having the right behavior is all that could ever be asked
as evidence of understanding.  In that case, I'd be tempted to say
they have a losing definition of "understanding", but maybe they're
just not interested in other sense of the word.  Who am I to say what
they should be interested in?

-- Jeff