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From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: more Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1990Jan9.162338.28110@twwells.com>
Date: 9 Jan 90 16:23:38 GMT
References: <2602@cunixc.cc.columbia.edu>
Organization: None, Ft. Lauderdale, FL
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In article <2602@cunixc.cc.columbia.edu> pnf@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu (Paul N Fahn) writes:
: I have always felt that there was something unfair and structurally
: unsound in Searle's argument, and upon reading his recent article in
: Scientific American, I've put my finger on it.

I don't particularly agree with your views; however, there is
another, more serious, flaw in his argument.

Suppose that the assignment of meaning is a process rather than a
static relationship. Were that so, the Chinese room would be
irrelevant, since it only corresponds to a particular process.

Hence his assertion that he has demonstrated that strong AI is
false is simply false.

Just to add a little "balance", I don't find the arguments on the
other side particularly compelling, either. And, in fact, their
arguments fall to the same point: intelligence is very definitely
*not* an I/O mapping. It is a process.

My own view is that, until we have a reasonable idea of how
consciousness operates, arguing about whether computers can be
conscious is about as anachronistic as arguing about the number of
angels that can dance on the head of a pin.

---
Bill                    { uunet | novavax | ankh | sunvice } !twwells!bill
bill@twwells.com