Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cs.utexas.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Military Cuts Message-ID: <12818@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 5 Jan 90 04:08:39 GMT References: <12686@cbnews.ATT.COM> <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: Oregon Graduate Institute (formerly OGC), Beaverton, OR Lines: 92 Approved: military@att.att.com From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) writes: > > >>P.S. If it were up to me, I would cut Army "heavy" divisions and strategic >>weapons first, and *NOT* air-mobile and naval forces. What do yall think >>on this? > >I would also be interested in your reasoning for disbanding a >'heavy' division. I'd also like to hear what a 'heavy ' division >is. If you mean armor, then I submit that this is a foolish whim >and that the US would be better served by disbanding B-52 wings. > >We might also do well by considering whether or not we really >*need* 17 attack aircraft carriers (that was Reagan's touted goal, >I'm unaware of how successful we've been in stopping that >nonesense) and assorted numbers of nuclear missile boats. > >The Air Force has been incredibly successful in avoiding the >purchase of appropriate logistics aircraft so that they could >afford larger numbers of B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters (which so >ably demonstrated precision vacant lot bombing in Panama :-) with >which their officers could fly very fast and make rank quickly. > >Now, I love airplanes. I'm an aeronautical engineer. But there >must come a time when we need to look at what we are spending our >money on and the results we get from it. The US is looking at a >long period of low-intensity warfare where it will be more >important to be able to air-move a division or a brigade quickly >than to bomb Moscow. The Air Force has not had the neccessary >cargo aircraft to perform this kind of mission since WWII. They >have consistently sold the Congress a line that goes "We have all >the logistics aircraft we need to perform our mission, but we >another wing of F-16s just in case the Albanians break through >Greece with MiG-31s". In case you hadn't guessed, I'm not >convinced. > Your comments are somewhat contradictory. It is not possible to move a heavy division anywhere quickly. All of the heavy vehicles are difficult to airlift, and even with the fastest ships still take awhile to get there and even longer to load and unload. If you feel that the primary threat in the future is Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) then heavy divisions are not the way to go. That was one of the complaints about the US Army's readiness for Vietnam. All of the mech infantry had to be taken out of their tracs and trained to operate on foot. [mod.note: Of course, you're not going to stop a Soviet armored thrust with light infantry and air cav... clearly, "heavy divisions" are needed for that job. - Bill ] I agree that the AF has its priorities screwed up about transport aircraft. During the Granada operation, there wasn't a military transport available for anything but the highest priority airlift. If a small operation such as that soaks up all the aircraft, what happens when we realy need LOTS of them? As for carriers, the goal was 15, although I am sure there were lots of naval aviators that would like to see 17. That was an unrealistic goal because there never were enough planes to fill them all up. As it is I believe that there are 1 or 2 fewer air wings than carriers. Some individual aircraft are in particularly short supply. The S-3 Viking produciton line has been closed for years. The navy is now using the airframes for all kinds of ancillary missions, such as the ES-3. Now they are hurting for fixed wing carrier ASW aircraft. The original goal (hope? :-) was that the Osprey would take up the slack. With it almost gone, the navy is rushing around to find a replacement. As for carriers in general, they are admirably suited to supporting LIC, and operations such as Grenada and Panama. In some cases, such as Grenada, the operation is distant from supporting land based air. Or even worse it could be Southwest Asia where we have essentially no land based air. A carrier can simply park over the horizon and wait. When you need it, is simply launches an airstrike and presto! instant urban renewal. No problems with allied support. No problems with overflight rights. Air wings are flexible and can be adjusted to the situation. If you need more bombers, put bombs on the F-18's or trade them for additional A-6's. The one carrier selling point that most everyone agrees upon is that they are a mobile airfield with few political entangelements that can be moved to where they are needed. If you need more planes bring in another carrier. The argument is how many do we need? How many can we afford? For each carrier you need escorts, support, and some base to hold it all. Then you need support for the escorts, support for the base, and escorts for the supoort going to the carrier and its escorts........... -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu