Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!uwm.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!usc!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Lessons Learned Keywords: lessons, grenada, panama Message-ID: <12860@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 6 Jan 90 02:19:47 GMT References: <12601@cbnews.ATT.COM> <12694@cbnews.ATT.COM> <12762@cbnews.ATT.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill Lines: 105 Approved: military@att.att.com From: smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) [mod.note: I think this covers both sides of the topic, "What were our objectives in Panama ?" With that, let's keep replies to email, unless someone can figure out how to work technology back into this. - Bill ] In article <12762@cbnews.ATT.COM>, rsiatl!jgd@gatech.edu (John G. De Armond) writes: > If your comments about "lack of foresight" refer to the looting and > riots that happened the first day or so, my comment would be that > concern for this HAD to be of low priority in the beginning. Securing > the country, protecting the Canal and capturing Noriega had to > take priority. And quite frankly (and being very nationalist here), I'd > hate to think American military lives had been risked exclusively to > protect Panamanian assets from Panamanians. This is a classic example of how not to think about operations of this type. Without getting at all into the question of whether or not we should have gone into Panama -- I will *not* discuss that in this newsgroup, and I hope the moderator doesn't permit anyone else to -- the *long-range* purpose of such an operation has to be to create a stable environment -- where the Canal isn't endangered, where the alleged drugs don't flow through, and where the population is ``sympathetic'' to the U.S. Now, the latter will never happen if the population doesn't agree with your basic goals, in which case you either maintain an army of occupation or install a more-or-less repressive government that will do what you want. Both of these can work for a while -- the Soviets did both in Eastern Europe 40 years ago, and it's only fallen to pieces this year. If the population is inclined to support you -- and there's reasonable evidence that a large portion of the Panamanian people are happy Noriega is gone -- then it is *vital* that you maintain that support. Anything negative that happens as a result of such military actions is attributable to you, whether it's civilian casualties or mass looting triggered by a breakdown in law and order. Pretending otherwise may be sound tactical thinking, but it's lousy strategy. And remember that this is a part of the world where the U.S. has a long history of intervening against the wishes of the population; any military moves in Latin America will generate a lot of ill will simply by their existence, regardless of the merits of the operation or even the previous sympathies of the people. Again, this is not to say that such operations are right or wrong (though I of course do have my own opinions) -- but you cannot ignore the larger picture and pretend it doesn't exist. Now, if you're planning an operation and the President tells you that you must do X, Y, and Z to ensure the proper popular response, you are not just entitled but morally and professionally obligated to say ``OK, but that will require T more troops, cost $M million more, and result in C more casualties.'' Then let the President make the decision. War, after all, is not violence for its own sake, but violence in pursuit of an objective. And most people (though not everyone, obviously) would agree that at some point you must fight; the major question is where one draws that line. Liberals, if you will, draw it much further away -- but when Pearl Harbor was attacked, there was only one vote in Congress against declaring war, the large isolationist sentiment notwithstanding. .... > The difference between, say WWII or Korea and now > is that back then we lacked a agressive and treasonous media in WWII. > Now, whenever someone gets shot, there are 20 camera lenses in the guy's > face recording his suffering. I very strongly object to the word ``treasonous'' in this context. Whether or not the media should report errors -- or phrased another way, whether or not it should obey its own ethical imperatives and tell the truth, be it ever so painful -- is a political question. Your inflammatory language does not belong in this digest. I heard enough such epithets 20 years ago, when some members of the public (and especially politicians) thought that criticizing aspects of American foreign policy was ``treasonous''. More or less by definition of constitutionally-guaranteed liberties, that charge is nonsense. If you want to discuss the issue in this forum, you can say something like ``public support today is less because of increased media coverage''. I may not agree that that's the cause, but it's a way to say it that doesn't violate the charter of this newsgroup. > I was working late and had CNN on the night of the invasion. The > behavior of CNN was abhorrent. By 2 o'clock, they were out trolling trying > to find someone to say something bad about the invasion. No one from > Congress (!) would say anything bad. About the best they could do was > to interview other journalists who were very free with criticism. It is the responsibility of journalists to report all sides of a story. They would have been remiss had they not searched around. As for why some other journalists might be freer with criticisms -- journalists live closer to the center of power, and hence are much more skeptical of the reasons given. And the announced reasons are often very far from the truth, though depending on the situation it may take more or less digging to find out what's really going on. (For an example of what I mean, I suggest reading ``The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Program''. It's an excellent book -- it won the Pulitzer Prize, as well as tenure for the author -- and does an excellent job of documenting how the real reasons for the early space program were very different from the publicly-stated ones. Much of the real reason, for example, was to be able to launch spy satellites -- a goal that was first articulated by the Rand Corporation in 1950. There's also evidence that while the U.S. didn't try to ``lose'' to Sputnik, Eisenhower and his advisors didn't care much who won, because they perceived geopolitical benefits to the Soviets setting the precedent of overflight by orbiting bodies.)