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From: ssc-vax!shuksan!major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Military Cuts
Message-ID: <12962@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 10 Jan 90 03:27:36 GMT
References: <12686@cbnews.ATT.COM> <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> <12818@cbnews.ATT.COM>
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From: ssc-vax!shuksan!major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt)

In article <12818@cbnews.ATT.COM>, terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes:
 
> Your comments are somewhat contradictory.  It is not possible to move
> a heavy division anywhere quickly.  All of the heavy vehicles are
> difficult to airlift, and even with the fastest ships still take
> awhile to get there and even longer to load and unload.  If you feel
> that the primary threat in the future is Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
> then heavy divisions are not the way to go.  That was one of the
> complaints about the US Army's readiness for Vietnam.  All of the mech
> infantry had to be taken out of their tracs and trained to operate on
> foot.  

  First, deployment.  You're right, a heavy division doesn't get moved
  anywhere quickly - until it's on the ground - and then armor and mech
  is pretty fast.  The 'fastest' deploying are the Airborne Divisions,
  for obvious reasons.  Then the 'Light Divisions' (foot-mobile).  Airmobile
  Divisions (101st & 1st Cav) are not that deployable - as experienced in
  a 1976 Reforger when the 101st was deployed to Germany - it took forever
  for the helicoptors, which went by ship, to get to Germany.  So, deployment
  is mission dependent.  The 'mix' of divisions has to do with the variety
  of places the Army have to be ready to deploy to.  For the most part -
  in Europe, it will be armor/mech vs armor/mech.  There are some areas 
  where 'Light' troops can operate - but they can't move around much.
  So, either Low- or High- conflicts - there must be a mix of capability to
  meet the threat.  The Army has to be 'ready' to go anywhere. 

  Second.  APC and IFVs are really, only a 'taxi' to the objective.  Any
  "good" mech infantryman will tell you that they must train to make the
  final assault 'on foot' - that their doctrine/training uses the APC/IFV
  as a safe means to get as close to the objective as possible - then
  dismount and make the final assault - which makes maximum use of their
  firepower and supporting arms.  As such, in Vietnam, 'mech infantry' 
  simply left their APCs at home - and fought as trained (arguably so)

  Now, I said 'good' mech infantry - it always seemed kinda difficult to
  kick the squads out of their APCs and get them to deploy on foot.  But,
  good NCOs/Platoon Leaders would somehow manage.  It probably had something
  to do with winter weather in Germany and the space heater in the Track. 
   
> 
> 	[mod.note:  Of course, you're not going to stop a Soviet
> armored thrust with light infantry and air cav...  clearly, "heavy
> divisions" are needed for that job. - Bill ]

  That could be argued, Bill.  They probably *could* stop an armored
  thrust - ONCE!    :-)




  mike schmitt