Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!clyde.concordia.ca!mcgill-vision!bloom-beacon!mintaka!think!yale!cs.utexas.edu!asuvax!ncar!ames!sun-barr!newstop!texsun!convex!cash From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Chinese Room by Shannon and McCarthy from 1956 Message-ID: <5270@convex.convex.com> Date: 8 Feb 90 14:53:18 GMT References: <2891@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <2903@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> <10599@june.cs.washington.edu> <14266@cs.yale.edu> <5319@star.cs.vu.nl> <90Feb7.120434est.6602@neat.cs.toronto.ed Sender: usenet@convex.com Organization: Convex Computer Corporation; Richardson, TX Lines: 54 In article <90Feb7.120434est.6602@neat.cs.toronto.edu> radford@ai.toronto.edu (Radford Neal) writes: >I've tried to understand the Chinese Room argument, and failed. It >seems to be based on a simple refusal to understand basic technical >and/or philosophical points. >... >Let us suppose that a machine is constructed that can at least mimic >all human intellectual and emotional behaviour. Whether this is possible >is an empirical question, but Searle appears willing to hypothesize that >it is. Will people consider the machine to be a "person", endowed with >attributes such as intelligence and morality? This too is an empirical >question. If they've had long conversations with it, heard it describe >its hopes and fears, had it help them with their personal problems, etc. >I think most people would consider it a person, but some might not, if >they knew how it was implemented. Finally, one might ask whether one >_should_ consider it a person. This is a moral question, similar to >that of whether one should consider members of other races to be people. >There is nothing logically inconsistent in Searle answering this question >in the negative, but once it is seen in this light, the argument looses >all force for those who do not share his prejudices. Your remarks are very sensible, and I am in much closer agreement with you than I am with Searle. But I have to rise to Searle's defense to the extent of saying that his mistakes are not quite as simple as you make out. Remember, Searle is a philosopher. He has certain philosophical hypotheses about what consitutes the essence of a thinking being. He believes that there is something altogether special about thinking beings, and that this special thing cannot--even in principle--be shared by any machine or program. From what he says, I gather that this "specialness" centers around the way humans use language. He thinks that there is a "semantic content" to the things we say, and that any system that uses mere rules to manipulate language does not and cannot use language in this way. Therefore, Searle would say that the question "Should we consider [the hypothetical machine that imitates a human] a person?" is not primarily a moral one. Instead, he would say that it revolves around a point of fact: does the machine's conversation carry "semantic content"? I believe that this talk about "semantic content" is nothing more than a modern rephrasing of the old philosophical jargon about "consciousness". Furthermore, I believe that the nature of "semantic content" will prove just as elusive as was "consciousness": you just can't take it to the bank. (Of course, to prove that I am correct would take a sizeable philosophical paper, and is not the sort of thing one can undertake in a net posting.) -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist. | Peter Cash | (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein) | cash@convex ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~