Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!cs.utexas.edu!mailrus!ukma!rshelby
From: rshelby@ms.uky.edu (Richard Shelby)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: more Chinese Room
Summary: a bit more on Descartes
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room, Descartes, Cartesian
Message-ID: <14319@s.ms.uky.edu>
Date: 25 Feb 90 21:27:54 GMT
References: <1990Feb13.225830.13432@wam.umd.edu> <859@wrs.wrs.com>
Distribution: usa
Organization: U of Ky, Math. Sciences, Lexington KY
Lines: 91

hwajin@wrs.wrs.com (Hwa Jin Bae) =  > >>  and  >
kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) =  > >

> >>The idea that one can definitely identify a corresponding
> >>physical parts of anything that is non-physical seems to
> >>be also based on the same old Cartesian model of world view;

This is definitely not Descartes' view; Descartes continually insisted
that the non-physical is simple and indivisible, hence cannot be broken
into parts (whether corresponding to physical parts or not).  Aristotle,
on the other hand, did argue that a proper method of inquiry for non-physical
`objects' is the analysis of the object into constituents, even if the
constituents do not exist in reality.  You were perhaps misled because
Descartes does undertake a functional analysis of mind, but this is
function only and has nothing to do with constituent parts.

[bulk of discussion deleted] . . .
> You seem to be missing the point of my reference to the categorization.
  . . . 

I think *I* must be, because I'm not following your reasoning at this point.

> ...  Why don't you try reading the original sentence quoted here again. ...

I did, and I still don't follow you.  Could you make your argument a little
more explicit (perhaps by not omitting steps) and perhaps use slightly
different words?

> Nevertheless, Descartes certainly was *not* *opposed* to this view
> of categorizing things.  . . .

What exactly is *this* view of categorizing things?  If you mean the
Aristotelian view, then, yes, Descartes was opposed.

>        . . .  To Descartes the material universe was a machine and
> nothing but a machine.  Nevertheless he did extend his mechanistic
> view of matter to living organisms and explained at gr[e]at length
> how the motions and various biological functions of the body could
> be reduced to mechanical operations, in order to show that living organisms
> were nothing but automata.

Technically, Descartes thought only non-human living organisms were automata,
humans, he argued are something more (i.e. they have minds).

> . . .
> >Note that Searle accuses the Strong AI'ers of Cartesianism.  He is *right*
> >that those who suppose pure calculation can constitute a mind have a
> >position resembling Descartes.  He is *wrong* to suppose that anyone
> >holds such a position.  . . .

Descartes' (functional) analysis of mind includes much more than calculation,
although it *is* true that many of his followers have ignored the other
mental functions, such as perception and intuition.  However, it is still
wrong to say that Descartes held the position that "pure calculation can
constitute a mind".

[much discussion deleted]
> In any case this type of thinking is also part of what Cartesian thinking
> is all about.  The notion that all can be explained by mathematical
> analysis and logical deduction of observed phenomena.

This is perhaps true, but *if* it is, it is solely because of Descartes'
theory of human perception, or perception as a mental act.  If by "logical
deduction of observed phenomena" you mean what the positivists meant, then
your statement is totally false.

>                                                        The mathematical
> certainty accepted thusly is the basis of all knowledge from this point
> of view.  As we know now this is a profoundly incorrect concept as evidenced
> by recent advances in physics and Godel's Incompleteness theorem.
 
Two comments:  1) Strictly speaking, Descartes posits mathematical certainty
as derivitive, not fundamental.  The fundamental certainty is something 
non-mathematical, although it may perhaps be most easily and clearly seen
in mathematical examples.  2) Caretesian certainty is not about the body
of theorems deduced from a set of axioms, but rather about the processes of
deduction, perception, intuition, etc.  Godel's incompleteness theorem is
about formal systems and does not cast any doubt on mathematical reasoning.

In discussions such as these, it is better to refer to Descartes'
followers than to Descartes.  As is the case with all great thinkers,
the followers often misunderstand, misread, misrepresent or mis-whatever
the original thinker's views, and perhaps all that both of you have said
is true of some follower of Descartes.  The main problem with what has
been said of Descartes is that it is an extreme oversimplification.
Descartes' philosophy may be wrong, but it is not simplistic.

-- 
Richard L. Shelby                    rshelby@ms.uky.edu
Department of Health Services        rshelby@ukma.BITNET
University of Kentucky               {rutgers,uunet}!ukma!rshelby