Xref: utzoo talk.philosophy.misc:3657 comp.ai:6085 Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!venera.isi.edu!smoliar From: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,comp.ai Subject: Re: Why the Chinese Room doesn't convince Message-ID: <12038@venera.isi.edu> Date: 26 Feb 90 23:37:09 GMT References: <12015@venera.isi.edu> <6595@cps3xx.UUCP> Sender: news@venera.isi.edu Reply-To: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu.UUCP (Stephen Smoliar) Organization: USC-Information Sciences Institute Lines: 47 In article <6595@cps3xx.UUCP> sticklen@cpswh.cps.msu.edu (Jon Sticklen) writes: > >i have a similar intuition as stephen that symbol level processing >is not everything. but i find his arguments not compelling me toward >that conclusion. > >where is the compelling support for sub-symbolic storage and retrieval >in stephen's example? > Actually, it was not my intention to muster "compelling support for sub-symbolic storage and retrieval." My goal was much more modest. I simply wished to point out that we should be skeptical in Ken's claim that all information "can be expressed and processed in symbolic form." My personal feeling is that the term "sub-symbolic" is in danger of a modest level of abuse from a variety of different connectionist camps, each of which has a different angle on how they want to use it. I would prefer to punt on the term altogether and try to be a bit more specific in saying what constitutes an alternative to a symbolic approach. The reason I cited Minsky is that the alternative I am most interested in pursuing is one based on processes. Yes, THE SOCIETY OF MIND has returned us to the old procedural/declarative controversy; but, hopefully, we have a bit more experience in the varieties of knowledge representation this time around. My question is: Can we define some collection of relatively simply processes whose activities yield behaviors which outside observers may describe as the formation of categories and the assignment of labels to those categories? One of the major punch lines of Gerald Edelman's NEURAL DARWINISM is that algorithms based on selection from a population may allow us to deal with the first half of this question--category formation. Supposedly, he is taken on the assignment and manipulation of labels (which brings us into the realm of symbols) in his new book, THE REMEMBERED SELF; but I have not progressed far enough in reading it to comment as to how successful he has been. If he pulls it off, then he may have a foundation for how symbol-manipulating behavior may be an emergent property of processes which are not, themselves, symbol manipulating. ========================================================================= USPS: Stephen Smoliar USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 Marina del Rey, California 90292-6695 Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu "Only a schoolteacher innocent of how literature is made could have written such a line."--Gore Vidal