Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!wang!sununix!lws
From: lws@comm.WANG.COM (Lyle Seaman)
Newsgroups: comp.unix.i386
Subject: Admin of SCO (was Re: 386/486, well configured: HOW MANY USERS?)
Message-ID: <1990Mar1.005241.24643@comm.WANG.COM>
Date: 1 Mar 90 00:52:41 GMT
References: <129@n4hgf.uucp> <8d.I02cO8a0k01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com>
Distribution: na
Organization: Wang Labs, Platform Comms.
Lines: 27

dacseg@uts.amdahl.com (Scott E. Garfinkle) writes:

>From article <129@n4hgf.uucp>, by wht@n4hgf.uucp (Warren Tucker):
>>    SCO is _much_ easier to configure and administer.
>>    The C2 Trusted Computer features are for neurotics, paranoids,
>> left-brains, or worse yet government control freaks.  Not recommended
>> for sane human beings.
>I agree with the latter statement, though it somewhat contradicts the former
>statement -- there is *no* way to remove completely the secureware (C2/B1)
>stuff from SCO Unix.  Also, having installed/administerd both SCO Unix and
>ESIX, I wouldn't necessarily say that SCO is a *lot* better.

I too agree.  The single largest problem I have with administering SCO's
UNIX is that cockeyed C2 stuff.  Occasionally it becomes necessary to 
go in and manually hack on their database.  Fortunately, they didn't make
it _so_ complicated that I can't figure it out.  Of course, given that 
the folks at SCO don't much like the idea of people manually modifying 
their database, and given that they can't prevent it on a UNIX system,
their next step will probably be to so thoroughly obscureware everything
that you couldn't find your way around without a big ball of string.  What's
more, in a development group environment, when a user's directory is 
default drwx------, it's a great pain to explain to every PC owner that
she must change the permissions s.t. files can be shared among group
members.  etc, etc.
Lyle.
lws@comm.wang.com